The authoritarian regimes that expanded throughout Latin America in the 1960s were designed by their inspirations not only to solve the dilemmas that came from political conflict but also from the economic bottlenecks that hindered national and regional development. This article investigates how planning was specifically implemented by the regime of the “Argentine Revolution,” since its inception in 1966, as part of its model of authoritarian modernization. The Cordobazo showed that the authoritarian project had weaker bases than those assumed by its leaders. This determined that the planning bias was accentuated. The development plans were then conceived as a public action mechanism with a strong techno-bureaucratic content with the expectation that a national capitalism could be established. But they were also planned as a mechanism for expanding the social base of support, vis à vis the transition that was approaching.

Los regímenes autoritarios que se expandieron por América Latina en la década de 1960 estuvieron diseñados, según sus inspiradores, para resolver los dilemas que provenían de la conflictividad política, pero también de los estrangulamientos económicos que trababan el desarrollo nacional y regional. Este artículo investiga cómo la planificación fue instrumentada específicamente por el régimen de la “Revolución Argentina” como parte de su modelo de modernización autoritaria desde sus inicios mismos, en 1966. El Cordobazo mostró que el proyecto autoritario tenía bases más endebles de lo que suponían sus dirigentes. Esto determinó que se acentuara el sesgo planificador. Los planes de desarrollo fueron concebidos entonces como un mecanismo de acción pública de fuerte contenido tecnoburocrático, con la expectativa de que pudiera afianzarse un capitalismo nacional. Pero también fueron ideados como mecanismo de ampliación de la base social de apoyo, vis à vis la transición que se avecinaba.

Os vínculos entre o empresariado argentino e o regime peronista estiveram submetidos a uma política econômica que era fundamentalmente uma política de distribuição de rendas. As reações dos empregadores de mão de obra, principalmente os industriais, estiveram dominadas por uma ambivalência fundamental que impedia que esse setor adotasse uma direção única frente ao regime. De fato, é evidente que a relação privilegiada que estabelecida por Perón com o setor obreiro relegava o empresariado a um papel menos preponderante ao que tivera no passado. Mas esse mesmo fato convertia o setor industrial em um eixo capital das políticas públicas, já que era o produtor direto dos bens de consumo popular e promotor fundamental do emprego, fatores inseparáveis do círculo virtuoso em que se sustentava o consenso político da "Nova Argentina". Se a necessidade de conservar, e incrementar, o apoio dos trabalhadores tendia a elevar o nível dos salários, o fechamento do mercado nacional para a importação competitiva garantia à indústria nacional um mercado cativo. As condutas corporativas e individuais dos empresários tenderam a buscar aumentar os benefícios concedidos pelo Estado nacional e, ao mesmo tempo, buscavam conter a crescente influência dos trabalhadores nas empresas.

The connections between the Argentine entrepreneurial class and the Peronista regime were subjected to an economic policy that was basically a policy of income distribution. Reactions on the part of employers of wage labor, particular within industry, were dominated by a fundamental ambivalence that kept this sector from adopting a single position in relation to the regime. In fact, it is evident that the privileged relationship that Perón established with the working class relegated the entrepreneurial class to a less preponderant role than it had enjoyed in the past. But this very fact made the industrial sector a fundamental axis of public policies, since it was directly responsible for the production of basic consumer goods and a prime source of employment, inseparable elements of a virtuous circle that sustained the "New Argentina's" political consensus. If the need to preserve and increase support to workers tended to raise wage levels, the closing of the national market for the sake of competitive importation provided a captive market for national industry. The individual and corporate behavior of entrepreneurs generally sought to increase the benefits conceded them by the national State while at the same time attempting to keep workers' growing influence within industry in check.

Les liens entre les entrepreneurs argentins et le régime de Péron étaient soumis à la politique économique caractérisée essentiellement par la politique de distribution de revenus. Les réactions des employeurs, surtout parmi les industriels, furent imprégnées d'une ambivalence importante empêchant ce secteur d'adopter une seule direction face au péronisme. En effet, il va sans dire que la relation privilégiée établie par Péron avec le secteur des travailleurs attribuait aux entrepreneurs un rôle moins important de par le passé. Pourtant cela transformait le secteur industriel en un axe essentiel des politiques publiques, puisqu'il était producteur des biens de consommation populaire et créateur d'emploi, ce qui constituait des facteurs indissociés du cercle vicieux qui soutenait le consensus politique de la « Nouvelle Argentine ». Si le besoin de garder et d'élargir l'appui des travailleurs exigeait l'augmentation des salaires, la fermeture du marché national à l'importation compétitive assurererait à l'industrie nationale un marché apprivoisé. Le comportement des entrepreneurs individuellement et comme corporation cherchait à accroitre les bénéfices distribués par l'État et en même temps à arrêter l'influence de plus en plus importante des travailleurs dans les entreprises.

O artigo analisa o processo regulador do Estado sobre as economias nacionais do Brasil e da Argentina, baseado principalmente no modelo dos "conselhos técnicos", desde o início do século e, principalmente, após a crise econômica mundial de 1929. Ao mesmo tempo, através da discussão sobre o papel do corporativismo em cada um desses países, analisa como os respectivos Estados relacionaram-se com os diversos atores sociais, particularmente os empresários, através das associações de classe, a fim de se redistribuir os recursos econômicos e políticos.

The article analyses State regulatory process of Brazilian and Argentinean national economies since the beginning of the century, especially after the 1929 crisis of the world economy, based mainly in the model of "technical councils". At the same time, it analyses, through a discussion of the role of "corporatism" in each of these countries, how their States related with different social actors, particularly entrepreneurs, through class associations, with the aim of redistributing economic and political resources.

L'article présente le processus régulateur de l'Etat à l'égard des économies nationales du Brésil et de l'Argentine, en s'appuyant principalement sur le modèle des «conseils techniques», depuis le début du siècle et notamment après la crise économique mondiale de 1929. Parallèlement, en examinant le rôle du corporativisme dans chacun de ces pays, l'article analyse comment ces États ont entretenu des rapports avec plusieurs acteurs sociaux, surtout les entrepreneurs, par l'intermédiaire des associations de classe, afin de distribuer les recours économiques et politiques.